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INTRODUCTION 
Agricultural technology and trade patterns have reached the point where 
an adequate agricultural transportation system is absolutely essential for 
farm prosperity in Minnesota and the Upper Midwest. Our cash grain farms 
increasingly require reliable access to international markets. About one-half 
of Minnesota's corn crop and one-third of its soybean crop are typically 
exported. An even higher proportion of Minnesota and North Dakota wheat 
and sunflowers are exported. 
If this grain cannot be moved into export channels--either because of 
a lack of transportation facilities or because high transportation costs 
make it non-competitive in international markets--returns per acre of farm-
land will decrease, marginal land will come out of production, and the value 
of the remaining land will decrease. Rural firms which provide goods and 
services to farmers and farm families will feel the impacts almost immediately. 
Upper Midwest farm products are especially vulnerable to transportation 
shortfalls. Because of the distance from the oceans and the deepwater ports, 
Upper Midwest farms are the last to prosper and the first to be hurt during 
swings in expor~ demand. Consequently, it is necessary to be ready to ship 
to where the markets are located. The Upper Midwest must have alternative 
outlets. Upper Midwest grain merchants must be able to ship to ports on 
the Gulf of Mexico, or out through the St. Lawrence Seaway, or by rail to 
the West Coast or even to the East Coast. That type of flexibility is 
essential to a healthy agriculture. 
There are some important trends in agricultural transportation--some 
continuing and some developing--that must be recognized if future transpor-
tation requirements are to be met. 
"What are these future agricultural transportation requirements?" 
That question cannot be answered definitely without knowing what the world 
supply and demand for food is going to be in the year 2000 and who will have 
the purchasing power to buy it. It requires answers to questions like: 
What will the world population growth be in the next 20 
years? 
In what countries will this population growth occur? 
Will the industrialized nations continue to subsidize 
exports of food produced by their farmers? 
Who will be the "good guys" and the "bad guys" in the 
world's shifting political alliances? 
-2-
Future agricultural transportation requirements will also be affected 
hy stnte and federal government policies on such things as port and water-
WQY user charges, railroad mergers, economic regulation of transportation, 
energy controls and road, bridge and highway financing. 
Citizens of Minnesota and other states can have influence on some 
developments and policies through their political and economic activities. 
However, frequently Hinnesota citizens, firms and government officials will 
have to respond to external events and trends. This report discusses a 
number of these trends and external factors and how they impact Minnesota 
agricultural transportation. 
UNITED STATES FOOD EXPORT POLICY 
One of the key questions is, "what will the U.S. policy on food exports 
be in future administrations?" Recent administrations have basically supported 
all-out agricultural production and have encouraged agricultural exports. 
A primary driving force behind this policy was to use foreign agricultural 
sales to obtain foreign exchange to help pay for the United States oil 
imports. However, as we reduce imports of oil, the U.S. foreign exchange 
problems will become more manageable. Then the political pressures for an 
all-out agricultural export policy will decline. A future administration 
may encourage extensive conservation measures at the expense of farm produc-
tion and exports. This is a real possibility. There are people, some with 
excellent credentials, who will argue that we are farming too intensively 
with too little regard for conservation and, consequently, exporting our 
future soil fertility and production capacity. If their arguments prevail, 
then some future administration may adopt farm policies that will deliberately 
reduce our farm exports. Many agriculturalists do not agree with their argu-
ments, but this is an important issue that deserves the most serious considera-
tion. 
Another key question influencing export demand is the future strength 
of the dollar as a world currency. One of the driving forces behind the 
increase in farm exports during the 1970's was the devaluation of the dollar 
in 1971 and the continuing weakness of the dollar throughout the decade. 
A strengthened dollar is not good for farm exports for two reasons. First, 
it takes more dollars to buy an equivalent amount of U.S. agricultural products. 
Second, OPEC oil is priced in dollars. When the dollar strengthens, OPEC oil 
prices to other countries increase in real terms. This reduces the purchasing 
power of those countries for both food imports and oil imports. If a country 
can produce some food but no oil, it tends to first use its foreign exchange 
for oil for heating, transportation and power--and only aftar meeting those 
needs, will it buy U.S. grain. In fact, high oil prices may cause some poten-
tial food importers to become self-sufficient or nearly self-sufficient in 
food production. 
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AGRICULTURAL EXPORT TRENDS 
Historically, Minnesota adjusted for its locational disadvantage in two 
distinct ways depending on whether the product was feed grain (i.e., corn) 
or food grain (i.e., wheat). A very high percentage of the corn produced 
was consumed on the farm or locally and converted to less bulky meat, dairy 
and poultry products. The potential problems of high transportation costs 
and logistics capacity for bulk corn was thereby avoided until the grain 
export boom of the 1970's. Upper Midwest wheat and wheat flour, on the 
other hand, has always been shipped long distances eastward to the population 
centers of the U.S. industrial northeast, and even farther to the historic 
Old World markets of Europe where the Region's durum and hard, red spring 
wheats were preferred for bread and baking. 
This movement developed very early in the history of the country. Its 
initial development was due to the favorable transportation costs at the time. 
Over the years, a favorable rate structure was developed, and this encouraged 
the continuation and growth of the long distance movement of wheat and flour. 
Specifically, U.S. wheat has been moving eastward to U.S. and European 
markets since 1825 when the Erie Canal was opened. Use of the Erie Canal 
lowered the cost of transportation from Buffalo, New York, to Albany almost 
immediately from $100 per ton to $10 per ton and eventually to $3 per ton. 
This opened a way for the Old Northwest (the current Midwest) to get its 
produce to market. Although that area is considered part of the Corn Belt 
today, the primary cash grain there in the 1820's and 30's was wheat. In 
the years following the opening of the Erie Canal, New England's agriculture 
declined rapidly. Grain prices in Great Britain fell 40 to 60 percent as 
U.S. Midwestern agriculture expanded. Wheat production moved westward. 
Traffic grew from inland ports on the Great Lakes to Buffalo and the Erie 
Canal, and then up and down the sea coast or to England and Europe. 
After the Civil War, agriculture continued to expand westward. Great 
Lakes traffic grew and the trunk line railroads became important competitors 
with the Lakes for grain traffic from the Midwest. By the 1870's, railroad 
rate wars from the Midwest to the East were common. These ended with the 
establishment of the ICC in 1887 which institutionalized the railroad east-
west rate structure. That rate structure included export rates, port-
equalization rates, transit privileges, and proportional rates all designed 
to allow railroads to compete with Great Lakes water transportation. 
Eventually, the pattern of the Corn Belt, the dairy region of the Lakes 
states, and the Wheat Belt evolved. The high quality milling wheat of Minnesota 
and the Upper Midwest was served by water transportation from Duluth-Superior 
to Buffalo, and in recent years, by the St. Lawrence Seaway connection to 
Europe and by a stable established rail-rate structure. This rail-rate struc-
ture was designed to compete with wheat shipments over the lakes, and was 
equalized at a number of rail-basing points so that changes in the level of 
rail rates, through general increases, would not change the Upper Midwest's 
advantage over wheat coming through Omaha and Kansas City. Specifically, 
although frequently challenged, the rail rate for wheat from Duluth and 
-4-
Minneapolis to East Coast ports was generally 3¢ less per hundredweight than 
from Omaha and Kansas City. This favorable railroad rate structure for Upper 
Hid\vest wheat lasted almost to the present day. 
Since the late 1960's, however, two long-term trends in U.S. agricultural 
exports have developed which impact the Upper Midwest agricultural commodity 
flows, and consequently, its agricultural transportation requirements. First, 
is the increasing proportion of exports of feed grains such as corn and soy-
beans as opposed to food grains, i.e., wheat and flour. Wheat and wheat 
products accounted for almost 50 percent of the U.S. export tonnage of grain 
and oilseeds and their products in 1960, one-third in 1970, and only one-fourth 
in 1980 (Table 1). In addition, an increasing amount of U.S. export wheat is 
used as feed or is tied to feed grain sales. This is basically because of 
the increase in consumer demand for meat, and hence, livestock feed around 
the world. 
The second long-term trend is the shift in our export customers away 
from our historical markets of Europe. Table 2 shows the change in customer 
mix by area between 1971 and 1980. Although the total tonnage of farm exports 
in~reased by 172 percent during the decade, the export tonnage to the Common 
Market countries of Europe, which used to be our primary market for wheat, 
has increased only 56 percent. Agricultural sales to the centrally planned 
economies of Russia and eastern Europe in 1979 were greater than the total 
agricultural sales to western Europe in the early 1970's. The Russian grain 
embargo reduced this in 1980. Future sales to this area obviously will 
depend on world politics and events over the next several years. 
Mexico is now taking twice the quantities of our agricultural products 
as all of Latin America did 10 years ago. This trade should continue and 
grow because of U.S. demand for Mexican oil and Mexico's increase in food 
demand as a result of its very rapid population growth. 
Japan is a growth market and is now importing at about the same level as 
western Europe was 10 years ago. However, its rate of growth is less than 
that of several other areas. China is, of course, a huge market with whom 
we did not trade in 1971. The Pacific Rim nations of Japan and China are 
two of the three nations that are now the world's largest importers of food. 
The third large importer is Russia. 
The exports to Asia have shifted over the decade away from western and 
southern Asia, i.e., India and Pakistan, to southeast Asian countries border-
ing the Pacific. Growth in those markets has been much greater than the 
82 percent indicated in the table. 
What does this mean? Well, the U.S. is exporting to many more locations, 
but Minnesota and the Upper Midwest are not well located for exporting to many 
of these locations. Countries that are in a good location for exports from 
the Upper Midwest, such as Russia and the centrally planned economies, are 
primarily interested in feed grains to produce meat for their consumers--and 
not in wheat for bread production--and they are politically uncertain customers. 
In short, the Upper Midwest grain industry is at the end of the whip driven by 
world food demand and political events over which it has little or no control. 
TABLE 1 
EXPORTS OF UNITED STATES AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS 
(million metric tons) 
1/ Percent- 1/ Percent- 1/ Percent-
Total of of of 
Grain Grain Grain Grain 
Oilseed Wheat Oilseed Oilseed Soybeans Oilseed 
All Ag and and and and and and 
Year Commodities Products Products Products Corn Products Products Products 
1960 ~.A. 33.6 16.4 48.8 5.6 16.7 4.6 13. 7 
1965 57.1 52.2 19.8 37.9 15.1 28.9 8.2 15.7 
1970 63.5 57.9 19.4 33.5 14.4 27.5 15.6 29.9 
I 
\Jl 
I 
1975 101.7 92.5 32.1 34.7 33.4 36.1 16.3 17.6 
1980 163.0 146.4 37.2 25.4 63.0 43.0 28.8 19.7 
_lj Percentages will not total 100 because of other grains, e.g., rice, barley, oats, etc. 
Source: Compiled from U.S. Foreign Agricultural Trade Statistics Report. ERS/USDA various years. 
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TABLE 2 
u.s. AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS BY DESTINATION 
(million metric tons) 
1971 
Western Europe 26.4 
Eastern Europe 2.0 
U.S.S.R. 
Mexico Jj 
Other Latin America 5.3 
Japan 9.3 
Mainland China 
Asia - Less Japan & 
Mainland China 11.4 
Africa 2.3 
Others 3.3 
TOTAL 60 
19.5 in 1979. ll 
Jj Included in Latin America 
1980 
41.2 
11.4 
6.21/ 
10.1 
14.0 
24.9 
9.0 
20.7 
8.8 
16.7 
163.0 
AREA 
% Increase 
56 
4 70 
355 
167 
82 
283 
406 
172 
Source: Compiled from U.S. Foreign Agricultural Trade Statistics 
Report. ERS/USDA, calendar years 1971 and 1980. 
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WATER TRANSPORTATION TRENDS AND ISSUES 
THE GREAT LAKES/SEAWAY ROUTE 
The Great Lakes and the Seaway, and before that the Erie Canal, has been 
the route to move the hard, red spring wheat and durum from the Upper Midwest 
to Europe. In 1979, grain shipments through Duluth-Superior totaled over 8.5 
million metric tons of which about 7 million m~tric tons were exported. This 
was about 6.8 percent of U.S. grain exports even though there was a strike 
at Duluth-Superior for 91 days. The 8.5 million metric tons included 193 
million bushels of wheat, or nearly 15 percent of U.S. wheat exports, 52 
million bushels of corn, 25 million bushels of barley, and 27 million hundred-
weight of sunflowers. Over 93 percent of the movements were by lake or ocean 
vessel. The rest were by rail to East Coast ports or to food processing 
industries. Rail shipments are primarily during the winter months when the 
Seaway is closed. Soybean movements through Duluth-Superior have not been 
important in recent years. 
As noted previously, the movement of wheat to European Economic Community 
(EEG) countries is declining in importance relative to movements to develop-
ing countries served by other ports~ The extreme length of the Seaway and 
its capacity limitations tend to place the Seaway at a disadvantage for 
developing grain movements. The Seaway is an important residual route for 
corn exports when Gulf and East Coast ports are at capacity. In 1979, 67 
percent of the corn exports from Duluth went to Russia and eastern Europe. 
It is a preferred route for shipments to Russia by Russian ships because of 
Russia's foreign exchange strategy of using their own fleet as much as possible 
and the lack of deep-draft "super ports" on the Baltic Sea. 
One bright spot for Seaway exports is sunflower seed. There is a big 
demand in our traditional European markets for sunflower seed. Also, they 
are light in weight, and thus, do not present a draft problem on the Seaway. 
The Great Lakes and the Seaway face a troubled future for both political 
and physical reasons. On the political side, tolls on the Seaway, which were 
stable for nearly 20 years, essentially doubled between 1977 and 1980 and 
increased another 18 percent last spring. A 10 percent increase is scheduled 
for 1983. The toll increases on the Seaway, of course, impact traffic and 
flows for all commodities including grain. There are now serious proposals 
for port user charges to cover dredging and maintenance. The concept of 
port user charges is, of course, consistent with the Reagan administration's 
policies of local control of expenditures. However, the concept is being 
pushed most vigorously by deep-draft ocean ports who want to trade off user 
charges for a speed-up in channel and port improvements and for a looser set 
of environmental regulations. A major argument is that such development 
would help increase coal exports--which like grain exports provide needed 
foreign exchange to pay our OPEC oil bill. It would also give economic 
advantages to a few well-situated ocean ports like New York, Baltimore, 
and New Orleans at the expense of the Lake ports and the Upper Midwest which 
are already burdened with Seaway tolls. 
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Two types of constraints exist on the Great Lakes-Seaway system that 
limit its long-term potential. These are: 1) physical capacity limits due 
to channel depth, lock dimensions, and locking operations, and 2) seasonal 
limits due to the winter closing of the system. These constraints will 
seriously hamper any increase in grain exports through the Seaway that 
\vould be likely to occur between 1980 and 2000. 
The Welland Canal between Lake Erie and Lake Ontario is the short-term 
capacity constraint on the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Seaway System. Without 
expansion, the limit would be reached by about 1986, but it could be reached 
sooner if grain exports through the Great Lakes surge. However, Canada is 
implementing a number of minor structural and non-structural improvements to 
expand the Weiland's capacity to attempt to provide adequate capacity past 
1990 and possibly to the year 2000. 
Extension of the nine-month Seaway season for two or three weeks is 
feasible and will provide needed capacity increases for moving export grain 
in the short run. However, an increase in the Great Lakes' shipping season 
to 11 or 12 months without a corresponding increase in the Seaway season 
would be beneficial mainly to ore and coal haulers and the iron and steel 
industry and of little utility to Midwest grain shippers. If year-round 
access is to assist the grain trade, it is needed to international markets 
through the St. Lawrence Seaway and not be limited to Buffalo, New York. 
It does appear that the Seaway season will be gradually extended to 10 
months over the next several years, but there will be continued and severe 
opposition from environmentalists, eastern ports, East Coast longshoremen 
unions, and the overland transportation companies that compete for the 
Great Lakes traffic. 
By the year 2000, the physical capacity constraints of the Great Lakes 
and the Seaway will present numerous problems. The channel depth of 27 
feet is the most limiting constraint. Deepening the channel just three feet 
to 30 feet would have serious environmental impacts on water levels, shore-
lines, and ecological systems throughout the Great Lakes Basin. Deepening 
the channel to increase capacity does not seem feasible even in the years 
after 2000; thus, lake navigation by typical ocean vessels will become less 
economical or common. The Great Lakes-Seaway system will eventually evolve 
into a 27-foot draft inland waterway with transfer ports for true deep-draft 
vessels near the Gulf of St. Lawrence. 
THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER ROUTE 
As mentioned previously, the Upper Midwest is geographically disadvan-
taged for corn producers. Prior to the agricultural export boom of the 1970's, 
much of the corn was fed locally to dairy animals in the form of silage, or 
it was sold for feed in nearby markets. 
The export boom changed that. Now, about one-half of Minnesota's much 
larger corn crop is exported as many of the livestock and dairy farms have 
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been converted to cash grain farms. The proportion of Minnesota's corn crop 
that is exported is substantially higher than that of the United States as 
a whole. 
However, farm prices for corn in Minnesota are still among the lowest 
in the nation. Why? Simply stated, throughout most of the 1970's, it was 
the last area in the nation that the exporters would buy from because of 
its distance from the Gulf ports. Sixty percent of the corn exported from 
the U.S. is shipped by barge to the Gulf. However, the Upper Midwest has 
the longest barge haul, as well as the highest barge operating costs of any 
major grain traffic segment on the river system. However, with the exception 
of the drought years of the mid-70's, truck-barge shipments of corn from 
the area expanded rapidly. This was not primarily due to rail car shortages, 
branchline abandonments, or other railroad problems. It was due primarily 
to truck-barge rates to the Gulf declining throughout the period when com-
pared with single-car rail rates so that truck-barge transportation to 
the Gulf was the lowest cost route. 
Mississippi River transportation has a number of problems including the 
Lock and Dam 26 bottleneck at Alton, Illinois, proposals to increase user 
charges, and restrictions on the Corps of Engineers' dredging. 
Lock and Dam 26 has been operated at or near its capacity since 1976. 
There is no question that this lock is a bottleneck that restricts the 
capacity of the cheapest method for transporting grain from the Upper Midwest 
to the Gulf of Mexico and has silently caused expensive changes in grain 
flow patterns. This bottleneck will continue until about 1990. 
A paradox exists in that barge shipments from the upper reaches of the 
Mississippi River (i.e., from the Twin Cities and Winona) have increased 
consistently since Lock and Dam 26 reached its capacity of about 63 million 
tons per year six years ago. For example, almost 7 million metric tons of 
grain and soybeans were shipped by barge from Upper Mississippi River terminals 
in 1979, up from a little over 3.6 million metric tons in 1970 and 4.5 million 
metric tons in 1976. That is because barge shipments from the Upper Mississippi 
have larger transportation cost savings than from locations closer to Lock 
and Dam 26. Consequently, these shipments have forced grain from Iowa and 
Illinois off the river. That grain then goes by an alternative mode or to 
an alternative port at a higher cost and causes expansion of the alternative 
mode or port. That is, grain is diverted to the Gulf or to the East Coast by 
rail, or by truck to lake ports because of the lack of capacity at Lock and 
Dam 26. 
The new Lock and Dam 26 is under construction and is scheduled for 
completion about 1988. At this time, the capacity will still be constrained 
to about 73 million tons for 18 months until parts of the old lock and dam 
can be removed. The capacity of the new, single 1200-foot lock, as currently 
authorized, is estimated to be about 89 million tons per year from 1990, or 
about a 40 percent increase over the present capacity. 
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One of the unsettled arguments regarding Lock and Dam 26 has been whether 
or not a second lock chamber is needed at Alton, and if so, how large should 
that lock chamber be, i.e., 600 or 1200 feet long? Proponents of building 
a second lock at the present time maintain that the new lock will be operated 
at capacity immediately because of the growth in demand for river transpor-
tation over the next decade. This probably will not be the case as the rail-
roads and alternative outlets to the Gulf for Midwest barge grain (Pacific 
Northwest, East Coast, and lake ports) will have established capacities and 
handled the grain during the 1980's. The railroads and ports will attempt 
to keep this business through contracts, concessions and competitive measures. 
In time, this grain may shift back to the river, but not immediately. When 
the new lock opens, its capacjty will be adequate for several years. 
There have also been arguments that when the capacity of Lock and Dam 
26 is enlarged, other locks will become bottlenecks. This is not true as 
Lock and Dam 26 is located at Alton, Illinois, just below the conjunction 
of the Illinois River and the Upper Mississippi River. During the 1970's, 
each of these rivers (the Illinois and the Upper Mississippi) contributed 
about an equal amount of traffic to Lock and Dam 26, so that Lock and Dam 
26 handled about twice as much traffic as any of the locks immediately above 
it. The locks on the Upper Mississippi are the same size as the current 
Lock and Dam 26 so they will not automatically be at capacity when the new 
26 is opened. Lock and Dam 2~below 26, is a new lock and dam with two 
1200-foot chambers; thus, it will not be a capacity problem. 
This doesn't mean that there will not be problems with lock and dam 
conditions and/or capacities. Almost all of the 27 locks on the Upper 
Mississippi were built in the 1930's with a design life of 40 years. Hence, 
major repairs and/or reconstruction will be necessary at many of these 
locks prior to 2000. Political battles and delays are likely. In addition, 
some locks, such as Lock and Dam 2 near Hastings, are used very heavily by 
recreational boaters causing this lock to be near capacity. However, low-
cost alternatives exist for locking small boats and should not present major 
problems. 
WATER USER CHARGES 
Waterway user charges will have more effect on barge volumes in the 
1990's than the capacity of new Lock and Dam 26. The amount of effect will 
depend on the outcome of current proposals for increased user fees. A fuel 
tax user charge was instituted on the inland river system as a result of the 
political compromise authorizing Lock and Dam 26 construction. This is now 
at 6¢ per gallon and is scheduled to increase to 10¢ per gallon in 1985. 
The current 6¢ tax is estimated to increase the cost of barge transpor-
tation from St. Paul to Baton Rouge by 2¢ per bushel and the future 10¢ tax 
by 3¢ per bushel. The current and 1985 user tax level and structure will 
have very little impact on grain flows. 
However, last year the administration proposed that a fuel tax of 36¢ 
per gallon be implemented, the Congressional leaders proposed, in all serious-
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ness, that all commercial navigation expenditures be recovered. Some of the 
proposals would change the structure of the user charges so that collections 
from the different river segments would correspond to the federal navigation 
expenditures on each segment. 
The proposals to increase the tax to 36¢ per gallon would increase 
barge transportation costs from St. Paul to the Gulf by about 10¢ per bushel. 
This would be significant and would impact grain flows and exports. A full 
expenditure recovery charge of 70¢ per gallon would raise barge transport 
cost to the Gulf an estimated 20¢ per bushel based on current volumes. 
However, at that level of user charge, sufficient volumes of commodities 
would leave the river so that user charges per unit would have to be made 
even higher to meet expenditures. The other proposals calling for changing 
the structure of the user charge to more closely match revenues and expen-
ditures on river segments would have an even greater impact on the Upper 
Mississippi River route and possibly raise costs so that only traffic that 
was truly captive to the river would remain. 
RAILROAD TRENDS AND ISSUES 
MULTI-CAR LOADING FACILITIES AND DIRECT RAIL SHIPMENTS 
Upper Midwest grain flows responded to the changing commodity and customer 
mix in the 1970's primarily by an increase in barge shipments of grain to the 
Gulf. However, the Lock and Dam 26 bottleneck and the success of unit grain 
trains in Illinois and Iowa eventually led to the introduction of multiple-
car and train load rates into the Upper Midwest. Table 3 shows the growth of 
multiple-car loading facilities in rural Minnesota. Note the growth in both 
size and number. Until recently, all of the multiple-car facilities were 
located in the corn and soybean area in southwestern Minnesota. Recently, 
unit-train facilities have been constructed in South Dakota and in the wheat 
areas of North Dakota and Minnesota. 
In 1979, about 1.8 million metric tons, or nearly 70 million bushels 
of corn and soybeans we.re shipped by rail from these loading facilities to 
Gulf ports for export. Direct rail shipments to Gulf ports were negligible 
prior to the mid-70's. This direct rail movement to the Gulf will continue 
to increase as a consequence of waterway user fees, Lock and Dam 26 conges-
tion, improved rail operations in the Midwest, and low unit-train grain rates. 
The rail system map going to the Gulf from the Upper Midwest is still 
undergoing changes. Parts of the defunct Rock Island will eventually be 
absorbed into the remaining railroads and the reorganized Milwaukee II will 
continue to be available as a bridge line. The merger of the Burlington 
Northern and the Frisco will allow single-line service from Minnesota and 
the Upper Midwest to the Gulf ports of Mobile and Pensacola and increase 
the importance of these Gulf ports for corn and soybeans. 
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TABLE 3 
MULTI-CAR RAIL LOADING 
FACILITIES IN MINNESOTA};_/ 
1974 1977 1981 
25-Car 14 29 39 
50-Car 5 11 9 
75-Car 9 
100-Car 3 
TOTAL 19 40 60 
l/Does not include terminal elevators in 
the Twin Cities and Duluth. 
Source: Yearbook: The Farmers Elevator 
Association of Minnesota -- various 
years. 
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Potential exists for two major international movements by direct rail 
which might impact the rail network of the Upper Midwest. One, unit train 
shipments to locations in Mexico, is already occurring and will undoubtedly 
increase. The other is a movement of Canadian grain by unit train through 
Minnesota directly to Gulf ports. The wheat area of the Canadian prairie 
is a geographical and geological extension of the U.S. Wheat Belt. Total 
logistics costs which include both land and ocean transportation to South 
America, Africa, and some other markets would be less if Canadian grain was 
shipped ou~ of U.S. Gulf ports rather than Thunder Bay, Ontario, on Lake 
Superior, or Vancouver, British Columbia, on the Pacific coast. This has 
not been so in the past because the artificially low grain rates in Canada 
subsidized Canadian grain movements. It appears that Canadian rail grain 
rates will be increased in the near future. When this occurs, the economic 
incentive to use the U.S. Gulf ports will increase. There are some problems 
and constraints, in such things as different quality grading systems, but 
these are relatively minor compared with the potential cost savings. One 
rail company, the Burlington Northern, runs from Winnipeg, Manitoba, to 
the Gulf. In addition, it is likely that railroads affiliated with either 
the Canadian National (the Grand Trunk Western) or the Canadian Pacific 
(the Sao Line) will purchase the reorganized Milwaukee II. In. that event, 
one of the major Canadian rail systems will control U.S. lines as far south 
as the Kansas City gateway. 
THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST RAIL ROUTE 
Some wheat from western North Dakota has always gone west. In the last 
decade, the quantities have been increasing and some westward movements now 
originate as far east as the Red River Valley. However, the real growth in 
shipments to the Pacific Northwest in recent years has been in corn for export. 
There was no corn exported from the Pacific Northwest ports in 1977. Sixty-
eight million bushels were exported in 1978, 171 million bushels in 1979, and 
270 million bushels (6.8 million metric tons) in 1980. This corn came by 
unit train from South Dakota, Minnesota, Nebraska, and Iowa. The latest 
development is that unit train shipments of soybeans direct to the Pacific 
Northwest for export were initiated during the summer and fall of 1981. 
What is responsible for this rapid growth of corn exports through the 
Pacific Northwest? Contributing factors include continued growth in demand 
in the Pacific Rim markets, the bottleneck at Lock and Dam 26, a capacity 
problem and increased tolls at the Panama Canal, and increased ocean fuel 
costs. 
However, the most important factor has been the development of low unit-
train rates. Table 4 analyzes the net price per bushel of corn obtainable 
from four major markets from locations in southwestern Minnesota in the fall 
of 1981. This was calculated by taking the bid price for corn in each of the 
four potential markets and subtracting the appropriate transportation cost to 
the market. The highest net price could be obtained by shipping 75-car trains 
to the Pacific Northwest export market. This was 20¢ per bushel more than 
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TABLE 4 
CORN PRICE AT VARIOUS MARKETS - NET OF 1 TRANSPORTATION FROM SOUTHWESTER::i HINNESOTA _/ 
(Dollars Per Bushel) 
MARKET CORN PRICE LESS TRfu~SPORTATIO~/ if 
CASH Single 26-Car 54-Car 75-Car 
MARKET CORN PRICE~/ Truck Rail Rail Rail Rail 
DULUTH/SUPERIOR 3.07 2.64 2.51 2.70 2.73 2.76 
1\-HN CITIES 2.93 2.71 2.59 2.75 2.76 2.78 
GULF 3.42 NA 2.22 2.64 2.69 2.74 
PACIFIC NORTHWEST 3.83 NA 2.54 2.88 2.95 2.98 
1/ 
- Walnut Grove, Minnesota. 
~/Number 2 Yellow Export Offers, Oct. 3, 1981, USDA. Grain & Feed Market News. 
l/Chicago Northwestern Transportation Company Freight Tariff CNW 4028-C 
Series, X003 Level. 
i/Minnesota Public Services Commission Distance and Commodity Rate Table 1. 
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could be obtained by shipping 75-car train to the Twin Cities, In general, 
direct rail shipments to the Pacific Northwest provided considerably higher 
net prices than any of the alternatives throughout the summer and fall of 1981. 
This is a very recent development. Throughout the 70's, the highest net corn 
prices would have been obtained by truck shipment to the Twin Cities (if 
barges were available so barge rates to the Gulf were favorable). Note in 
Table 4 that trucking to the Twin Cities would provide a more favorable net 
corn price than any location using single-car rail shipments. This demonstrates 
the truck rate advantage that caused the switch from rail to trucks through-
out the 1970's. Table 4 also indicates that the truck market in the Twin 
Cities would have provided a higher net corn price than 26- or 52-car trains 
directly to the Gulf ports during the 1981 harvest season. 
Using Table 4, it can be computed that an increase in trainload rates of 
21¢ per bushel (37¢ per hundredweight) and the same market prices would "price 
the Pacific Northwest out of the market." These rates to the Pacific North-
west are now very competitive due to the rail car surplus. They are compen-
satory, that is, they cover variable costs, but probably do not cover fully 
allocated costs. It is quite possible that rate increases could occur in 
the future and that other markets will provide higher net prices as they did 
as recently as 1980. 
RAILROAD DEREGULATION 
The Staggers Rail Act of 1980 provided for major changes toward less 
economic regulation of the railroads in the United States. In general, 
the current deregulation thrust is bipartisan and was promoted by the Carter 
administration even more vigorously than the present administration. There 
will be changes, adjustments, and probably some return to regulation, but 
many of the changes toward less regulation and more competition will be per-
manent. The most important principle of the deregulation movement to date 
is the common carrier concept of equal rates and equal services to all is 
no longer a guiding philosophy. Many of the old rules about price discrim-
ination were legislated away by the Staggers Rail Act of 1980. 
One of the probable results of rail deregulation is that rails will 
become more competitive with trucks for grain movements. Railroads are best 
suited for long distance movements of large quantities of heavy, bulk commo-
dities such as grain. Hm,rever, if the quantities are large enough, railroads 
can be a lower cost mode than trucks for relatively short distances. Rails 
have been severely hampered in the past by rate and service regulation 
that did not allow rail management to adjust rates and/or service to specific 
market opportunities or competitive situations. 
Deregulation of railroad rates and services has allowed railroads to 
become more flexible and hence, more competitive with trucks: Railroads 
have been raising rates on unprofitable and/or low volume services with the 
intention of covering the full cost of this traffic. They also have lowered 
rates with the intention of recovering grain business lost to trucks. 
-16-
In addition to the further loosening of restrictions on abandonments, 
the Staggers Rail Act allows railroads to surcharge low volume branchlines 
to recover the full cost of service. This means that rail shipments from 
branchlines can be changed substantially more than from nearby mainline 
locations. A manufacturing plant may be able to pay such a surcharge. 
Hmvever, for a grain firm, such a difference in transportation costs is the 
same as abandonment. 
This increased freedom to adjust rates and services should encourage 
railroads to make investments in plant and equipment such as yard improve-
ments in port areas that will produce efficiencies and cost savings that 
~vill eventually help grain movements. 
The act also authorizes railroads to enter into contracts with shippers, 
which was not allowed previously. The ability to write contracts will allow 
the railroad and shipper to negotiate rates, service, and volumes. The 
railroad can obtain efficiencies through better equipment utilization and 
needed capital improvements if the volume to support the improvements is 
guaranteed. Long-term contracts for large volume, short distance movements 
will allow railroads to recapture business lost to trucks. The formal legal-
ization of rail contracts will encourage the expansion of unit train movements. 
However, once established, volume contracts may tie shippers to a port 
or ports that might not be price competitive as grain markets shift seasonally 
or in response to shifts in export demand. Other risks or problems for 
shippers with volume contracts with railroads include shortages in the 
countryside so that the volume terms of the contract cannot be fulfilled, 
or the official rail rates may be lowered to less than the contract rates 
during periods of car surplus. In geographic areas where two railroads 
compete and enter contracts, the possibility exists that the total volume 
of rail shipments contracted for may be more than 100 percent of a normal 
crop. In that case, the shippers would be unable to fulfill the volume part 
of the contract and possibly be penalized by the contracting railroads. 
Rail mergers to increase efficiency are also encouraged by the Staggers 
Rail Act. Past and future railroad mergers will affect Minnesota grain 
flows as merged railroads attempt to route more grain traffic over improved 
or lower cost routes to ports with single-line service from an area. An 
example would be the development of single-line service for corn and soybeans 
on the Burlington Northern to the Gulf ports of Mobile and Pensacola as a 
result of the Burlington Northern-Frisco merger. 
Rail abandonments will continue. The Staggers Act, in general, makes 
it easier to abandon rail lines, and not only branchlines but any unprofitable 
rail lines--be they one mile or 500 miles long. The philosophy is "use it 
or lose it." 
The result of the Staggers Act rate deregulation, rail contracts, mergers 
and abandonments, will be a concentration of large volume grain movements 
through a limited number of mainline locations that can load multiples of 
25 or 26 cars or more. Trucks will haul grain farther from farms to country 
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::rain-loading facil i.ties. Th Ls has far-reaching implications for such things 
as the structure and organization of country elevators and the future of the 
small towns and businesses whose economic outlook ~as previously favorable 
because they were on a railroad mainline. In addition, the rural road net-
work will be impacted because heavier vehicles will travel farther to get 
to the train-loading locations with resulting costs to local governments. 
ROAD AND HIGHWAY TRENDS AND ISSUES 
We need a strong infrastructure of roads and highways to get agricultural 
products to locations where they can be processed or where rail or water can 
move them to export ports. This includes the rural road and country road 
systems, as well as our federal and state primary systems. However, there 
is n significant road and highway financing problem. We generally have not 
been building or rebuilding roads and highways as fast as we have been 
wearing them out. 
Agriculture as an industry has three interrelated concerns about roads 
and highways. The first is the financial crisis at all levels of highways 
from the interstate system to the township roads. The second is the inade-
quacies of our rural road and bridge system. The third is the relation ship 
between heavier vehicles, longer hauls, and increased highway wear. As a 
result of technology and shifting markets, vehicle sizes and lengths of 
hauls have been increasing for several decades. 
ROAD AND HIGHWAY FINANCING TRENDS 
Highway construction and maintenance have probably been as hurt by the 
hidden cost of inflation as any other part of our economy. Until recently, 
the costs of road construction and maintenance had been increasing much 
faster than inflation. On the other hand, our system for funding roads is 
almost independent of inflation. 
The primary sources of funds for roads have traditionally been gasoline 
taxes, vehicle and operator licenses, and property tax revenues. Revenues 
from the gasoline tax and license fees do not increase with inflation, but 
require legislative action. In fact, the impact of inflation on purchasing 
power has frequently been used as a reason not to increase these fees. The 
end result has been that revenues from the gasoline tax, which historically 
accounted for SO percent of our national highway and -road spending, were 
decreasing absolutely as a result of our national goals of improving gas 
mileage and reducing driving. Total highway fuel used in the U.S. dropped 
about 3.5 percent in 1979, 5.2 percent in 1980, and 2.7 percent through 
August 1981. This downward trend in gasoline consumption is permanent, 
as the 1985 model U.S. cars are projected to obtain 45 percent better gas 
mileage than the average car on the road in 1981. 
Gasoline tax revenues are spent primarily on the interstate and primary 
road system. In 1972, total Minnesota and federal tax on gasoline was 11¢ 
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per gallon, or about one-third the retail price. At that time, roughly 33¢ 
of every dollar spent on gasoline went to the construction and maintenance 
of roads and highways. Now, the total Minnesota and federal tax is 17¢ per 
gallon, but only about 12¢ of every dollar spent on gasoline goes to the 
road and highway system. 
Local revenues, such as the property tax, have been the primary source 
of funding for local roads. The property tax is theoretically a very good 
source of funds for local roads because the local property owner receives 
most of the benefits of local roads through improved access and increased 
property values. However, state limits on property tax levels has probably 
kept the level of spending on rural roads below that which rural people 
would be willing to pay even in the face of widespread discontent with taxes 
generally. 
RURAL ROAD ISSUES 
Our rural road system was built during the 1920's and 1930's when the 
average farm was less than 200 acres and farm trucks had gross weights of 
6 or 7 tons. In fact, 70 percent of U.S. rural bridges were constructed 
by 1935. About 50 percent of all the U.S. rural roads were improved before 
1950. 
Rural transportation needs have changed considerably since the 1930's. 
Crop yields have increased, U.S. farm size has doubled, and markets have 
shifted off the farm into national and international channels. Rural 
traffic characteristics have also changed. Tandem-axle trucks with gross 
weights of 23 tons have become common on rural roads. A farm tractor 
and two wagons loaded with soybeans can weigh up to 28 tons. These vehicles 
are traveling over bridges built when 8 tons were considered a heavy load. 
Obviously, we must maintain an adequate rural road system to cope with 
these changes. However, in many parts.of the Upper Midwest, we have too 
many rural roads to maintain efficiently. We no longer neeJ roads that 
were plotted at one-mile intervals to serve 160-acre farms with horses. 
If we were to lay out a road system today, we could put roads two miles 
apart and still have better access to towns and markets than we had 60 years 
ago. If the excess roads were eliminated, the number of intersections, and 
grade crossings would be reduced and the remaining land could be farmed. 
The selection of roads to be abandoned will be a tough political process, 
but bridge replacement needs will probably play a key role in these decisions. 
Vehicle weight limits on roads and highways are frequently a problem 
for agricultural shippers. However, they are necessary to protect our 
investment in roads as the stress exerted on highway pavement increases as 
the fourth power of the axle load. When axle weight increases from 9 tons 
to 10 tons, stress from that axle increases by roughly 50 percent. An 
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80,000-pound truck weighs 20 times as much as an automobile, but its combined 
axles cause 9,600 times as much stress on the pavement and roadbed. This 
presents a major problem for Minnesota and other Corn Belt states because 
we have many grain elevators and other rural businesses on 9-ton or seasonally 
restricted roads. These businesses, especially the elevators, have a severe 
competitive advantage compared with any nearby competitor on a year-round 
10-ton route. 
It is no secret that in the past, grain trucks frequently were over-
loaded. Farmers, truckers, and enforcement officials often failed to realize 
the magnitude of the damage and expense that overloading causes. Because 
of the potential damages, the weight limit laws require vigorous enforcement 
and education. 
Another rural road problem relates to the size, especially the width, 
of farm machinery. Should the farm machinery industry and farmers expect 
the public to provide adequate width for the movement of set-up machinery 
between farms? Is a bridge that is adequate and safe for automobile and 
truck traffic inadequate because it is too narrow for farm machinery? If 
so, then in a time of reduced road funds, where will the money come from 
for its modification or replacement? This issue will become more important 
in the future. 
UNIT TRAIN EFFECTS ON THE RURAL ROAD NETWORK 
Development of unit-train loading facilities and their use has had a 
mixed effect on the road and highway system. Like the old rail-rate struc-
ture, the primary highways of the area are generally east-west oriented. 
Usage and wear on these primary roads increased substantially throughout the 
70's as an increasing number of heavy grain trucks hauled grain longer and 
longer distances to the lake and river terminals. 
Increased direct-rail shipments of grain from country elevators has 
reduced the use of the primary highways. But now heavy vehicles used in 
grain assembly are going much longer distances over rural and secondary 
roads and are increasing the wear on these roads. These secondary roads are 
frequently not as well constructed as the primary roads which were previously 
used. 
The net effect of whether total road wear will increase or decrease has 
not yet been determined. However, there will be a transfer of the financial 
responsibility from the states to local units of government because financing 
the collector roads is generally a function of local government. This shift 
will become of increasing concern to the local officials who are responsible 
for highways. 
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